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RECENT CASES.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-SUBSTANCE

AND PROCEDURE-STANDARDS OF CONDUCT-

Action in an Ohio court for injuries received from an auto accident which occurred in Michigan. The defendant pleaded and proved decisions of the Michigan court establishing contributory negligence as a matter of law where one
drives an auto at night in such a manner as to be unable to discover an object
and perform the manual acts necessary to stop the car within the range of his
headlights. Held, that the Michigan rule was applicable in the Ohio court, and
on the evidence in the case the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict.
Interstate Motor Freight Co. v. Johnson, 168 IN. E. 143 (Ohio 1929).
It is well established that the law of the place where the wrong occurred
governs in all questions going to the substantive right of the plaintiff to recover
for torts, while those questions which concern merely the manner and method
of obtaining his remedy are regulated by the procedural rules of the court in
which such remedy is sought 1 In some respects it is perhaps hard to see the
absolute need for any such distinction as has been adopted. Whatever
right the plaintiff has accrues in the jurisdiction of the state where the
wrong occurs and is solely a creature of its laws; thus it would seem that the
procedural rules of that state, such as those governing the quality and degree

of the evidence, the burden of proof, presumptions,' and like matters are as
much a part of his right as the actionable quality of the'wrong itself. As
against this there is the purely practical reason that a court cannot be expected

to adopt a new and perhaps unfamiliar method of procedure for each case of this
type which arises in its jurisdiction; this consideration and a natural satisfaction
in their own rules of procedure have largely influenced the courts in drawing
such a distinction.' Yet it is only when the distinctive features of substance
shade into those of procedure that problems of difficulty are encountered by the
courts, and it has been held that the question as to which rules of another state
shall be considered substantive and which procedural is one to be determined
solely by the courts of the sovereign state in which the remedy is sought.3 That
'Northern Pacific R. R. v. Babcock, i54 U. S. 190 (1893); Louisville &
Nashville R. M. v. Whitlow's Administrator, io5 Ky. I, 43 S. W. 711 (898) ;
Pendar v. H. & B. American Mach. Co., 35 R. I. 321, 87 At. i (1913); Cf.

Johnson v. Chi. & N. W. Ry., 9i Iowa 248, 59 N. W. 66 (1894).
'Such matters are usually controlled by the lex fori. Jones v. ChL, St.
Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 8o Minn. 488, 83 N. W. 446 (igoo); Pennsylvania Co. v. McCann, 54 Ohio S. io, 42 N. E. 768 (I896). The distinction
is between "how to prove" and "what to prove". GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1927) 167.
'See CHAMBERLAYNE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE (I9i) § 171.
'Note (I918) I8 COL. L. REV. 354.
'Saint Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Cox, 17i Ark. 103, 113, 283 S. W. 31
(1926) ; this position has been criticized on the grounds that it might well create

a right where none existed under the lex loci; if a substantive rule of law of one
state be considered merely procedural in the state where the remedy is sought
and thus subordinate to its own rule, has not the plaintiff's right been modified?
See (1926) ii MINN. L. REv. 44.
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the Michigan rule of contributory negligence applied in the case at hand is
one of substance affecting the right itself, as opposed to the remedy, will hardly
be questioned; the rule established in Michigan is not one raising merely a
rebuttable presumption, nor affecting the burden of proof nor the weight of
the evidence; it prescribes a standard of care or conduct, violation of which
constitutes negligence of its own force, sufficient to defeat the actionable quality
of the defendant's wrong. Hence it is determinative of the existence of any
right at all in the plaintiff, and necessarily a substantive rule of law. On the
other hand the question of whether the evidence is in sufficient dispute to go to
the jury, or whether a question of causation is presented is to be determined
according to rules laid down by the forum, since the application of the facts
of each particular case to the standard of conduct to be utilized is a procedural
matter
Apart from the purelV factual problem which the instant case presented, it is clear that the court's application of the Michigan standard as controlling the plaintiff's right to recover is sound.Y
CORPORATIONS-POWER

OF A CORPORATION

ro RESTRICT THE TRANSFER OF

SHAREs-The defendant corporation by a charter provision reserved the right
to purchase its shares from all stockholders. A person who bought shares from
the corporation sold to the plaintiff in violation of this restriction. Plaintiff
brought a bill in equity to compel defendant corporation to register these shares
in his name. Held, that the restriction was reasonable, and therefore unobjectionITS

able. Dawson v. Household Finance Corporation,147 Atl. 312 (Del. 1929).

Although shares of stock ionstitute no exception to the general rule that
restraints on the alienation of property are strictly construed,' it is well settled
that a charter provision reserving the right to the corporation to have the first
opportunity to purchase its stock is valid! Granting that the courts will sanction
reasonable restrictions on the sale of corporate shares,' the question arises as to
what theory the courts will use in upholding these provisions. The Delaware
Court, in the instant case, rationalized their decision on the basis of a contractual relationship, on the theory that each person who became a holder of
the stock bound himself to afford the corporation the first opportunity to purchase his stock. This reasoning can be justified in cases where the seller of
the stock purchased it directly from the corporation, which was the situation
dealt with by the Delaware Court. However, where the seller has purchased
his stock from another, the corporation having waived its right to purchase in
the particular instance but by charter provision reserving the right to purchase
'CONFLICT

OF LAWS RESTATEmENT

'CONPLicr OF LAWS RESTATEMENT
'Chandler

(Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 65I.
(Am. L. Inst. 1928) §414 (b).

v. Northern Cross Ry. Co., i8 I11.i9o (1856);

New England

Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432 (1894) ; Wright v. Iredell Tel.
Co., 182 N. C. 308, io8 S. E. 744 (I92I).
'Francis v. Ferguson, 246 N. Y. 516, 159 N. E. 416 (1927); Dolph v.
Lennon's Inc., io9 Ore. 336, 220 Pac. I6i (1923); See 2 THomepsoN REAL
PROPERTY (1924) 1401.
'BALLANTINE PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1927) § 145, 6 THOmPSON LAW OF
CORPORATIONS, (3rd ed. 1927) 4156.
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from subsequent owners, the necessary privity between the corporation and subsequent owner is lacking. Other theories advanced by the courts to sustain these
restrictions are, the giving of equitable relief for interference with contractual
relations,' and the enforcement of a constructive trust.' It has even been suggested that here in effect the courts have recognized the equitable servitude of
a chattel
Provided that the restraint is set out in the charter, a logical basis
for its being upheld is that the corporation comes into existence with this
preemptive right." The objection to this reasoning has been that it would work
too much hardship on bona: fide purchasers without notice. In those states that
have adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,' purchasers without notice are
amply protected for the act makes it mandatory that all restrictions appear or
be referred to on the stock certificate.' Where the Act has not been adopted and
a corporation issues stock certificates that are not freely transferable without
disclosing the restriction, it is suggested that the corporation should be estopped
from setting up its preemptive right against bona fide purchasers. While stock
certificates are not negotiable, because of the commercial demand that these
shares be readily transferable, the courts of this country" have given these
certificates the attributes of quasi-negotiability.'
This doctrine, which has been
applied to protect purchasers from the undisclosed rights of previous holders
should also be used to protect them from the claims of the corporation itself.
Since this logical view is not affected by any mutations in the identity of the
corporate shareholders, and since bona fide purchasers may be protected, courts
might well follow this line of reasoning-at least until the matter of stock
transfers has been fully regulated by statute.

CORPORATIONS-RIGHT

OF

MAJORITY

TO SELL ENTIRE CORPORATE ASSETS

AGAINST DISSENT OF MIxORTY-Majority stockholders of insolvent corporation, joint defendants, contracted to sell entire corporate property against dissent of complainant minority stockholder. Complainant seeks to enjoin sale,
claiming inadequate price and personal benefit to defendant majority stockholders. Held, that the sale was valid. Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co. et al.,
147 Atl. 257 (Del. 1929).
'Farmers Mercantile & Supply Co. v. Laun, 146 Wisc. 252, 131 N. W. 366
(1911).
Weston v. Goldstein, 39 App. Div. 661 (N. Y. i8go).
0 (1928) 42 HARV. L. REv. 555.
"Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178 N. W. 957 (1920);
Prendeville v. Johnson & Higgins, 92 N. J. Eq. 515, 113 At. 915 (12I);
Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., sukra note 2.
8
See PARKER CORPORATION MANUAL (1928) 16o6.
9

UNIFORMI STOCK TRANSFER AcT,

§ 15,

PARKER CORPORATION MANUAL,

supra;

note 8.
' In England an entirely different rule prevails. Certificates of stock in that
country are merely evidences of shares and this muniment of title is not negotiable nor quasi-negotiable. Colonial Bank v. Cady, 15 App. Cas. 267 (1890).
' First Nat. Bank of South Bend v. Lanier, II Wall. 369 (U. S. 1870);
Loring v. Salisbury Mills, 125 Mass. 138 (1878) ; Knox v. Eden; Musee Americain Co., 148 N. Y. 411, 42 N. E. 998 (1896).
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At common law the majority of a solvent, prosperous, private corporation,'
able to achieve the purposes of its creation, could not, as against the dissent
of the minority, direct the sale of the entire corporate property," thereby causing
3
The rule is based on
what was, in effect, a dissolution of the corporation.
the contract right of every stockholder to have the corporate powers used solely
to further and promote the corporate purposes for which they were called
into existence, and hence their exercise in the absence of unanimous consent, to
destroy, by means of an act of self-willed dissolution, these purposes, is a
direct invasion of the contractual rights of every dissenting stockholder.'
Where the corporation is insolvent, or operating at a loss or a negligible profit,
the rule does not apply, and it is the unquestioned right of the majority to
This common law
liquidate the corporate assets and wind up the business.
disability of the majority to sell out a going, prosperous concern is by no means
Its magnum bonum has been the protection it has
a justifiable doctrine.'
afforded weaker stockholders from injustice, and, not infrequently, attempted
plunder in legal guise, at the hands of the controlling element.' On the other
hand, it has permitted the negative control of an entire corporation by a single
shareholder; prevented the majority from securing the benefits of an advantageous sale; and compelled the majority, when dissolution and reorganization were desired, to buy out the minority at its own, and often exorbitant,
The problem is one of
terms, in an effort to secure unanimous consent!
formulating a rule which will afford the real financial interests a maximum
amount of power, yet protecting in full the property rights of minority shareholders. Recently enacted statutes in almost every state have attempted to
answer this problem by permitting voluntary dissolution of private corporations
by a vote of a specified proportion, usually majority or two thirds, of the out'The discussion is inapplicable to quasi-public, charitable, and religious
corporations.
- Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590 (1921) ; Kean v. Johnson,
9 N. J. Eq. 401 (1853); Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578
(N. Y. 186I); Koehler v. St. Mary's Brewing Co., 228 Pa. 648, 77 At. ioi6
(igio); Taylor v. Chichester Rr. Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 379 (j867); 6 THGmPSoN,
CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 4499; 6 FLETCHER, CYC. CORPORATIONS (1919)
§ 4011. Contra: Warren, Voluntary Transfers of Corporate Undertakings
(I916) 30 HARV. L. REV. 335; NoYEs, INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS (I902) § III.
'While a sale of all corporate assets is not legally a dissolution, it is
generally treated as one for nearly all purposes, since the effects of both are
practically indistinguishable. 8 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 5452.
' (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 8o7; THOMlPSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 38o.
Naturally, if the right of sale by the majority stockholders is conferred by the
corporation charter or by statute, this contract right does not exist. Metcalf
v. American Furniture Co., i2 Fed. 15 (C. C. W. D. N. Y. I9O3); St. Louis
v. St. Louis Gaslight Co., 70 Mo. 69 (1879).
'Hayden v. Official Hotel Red Book Co., 42 Fed. 875 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
i89o) ; Smith v. Stone, 21 Wyo. 62, 128 Pac. 612 (1912) ; 2 FLETCHER, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 1207.
'See (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 671, n. 2, and authorities cited.
'See Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1004
(1904).
( See discussion of this problem in BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
(1927) 210; In re Timmis 2oo N. Y. 177, i8o, 9 N. E. 52-2, 524 (1910).
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The statutes, while not at all uniform, usually protect minority
standing stock
rights by providing that the sale must be without fraud, for a fair price, and
Moreover, the dissenting shareholder
for the benefit of all the stockholders'
is generally entitled to the cash equivalent of a disinterested appraisal value of
his stock, based on its intrinsic, not market, worth." Even in the absence of
specific statutory safeguards, courts, by maintaining an equitable control of
corporate powers, have fully protected the property rights of minority stockholders.'
Irrespective of these considerations, the decision in the instant case
is unquestionably correct, under the Delaware statute permitting voluntary
dissolution by majority vote, since the court found no circumstances indicating
fraud or unfair dealing; and it may be pointed out that a like decision would
have been rendered under the common law, which denied the usual majority
disability of dissolution to an insolvent corporation.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DENIAL

OF CONTINUANCE

AS DEPRIVING ACCUSED

for defendant withdrew
from the case which was already in progress and defendant suggested another
attorney who refused to accept employment unless the court would grant a
continuance of two weeks. This was refused and the court appointed two
attorneys to represent the defendant who, being convicted, appealed on the
ground that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to defend with
counsel.' Held, that the convenience of the court, the jury and the witnesses
OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF PERSONAL CHoIcE-Counsel

' CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PRoc. (Deering, 1923) § 1228 (two-thirds) ; CONN.
GEN. STAT. (1918) c. I88, § 3446 (three-fourths); DEL. REV. CODE (1915) c.
65, § 64A (majority) ; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 32, § 75 (two-thirds) ;
MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 155, § 50 (majority); N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910)
CORP., § 31 (two-thirds) ; N. Y. CONS. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1929) c. 24, § 101
(majority); AcT OF AtiwL 9, 1856, P. L. 293, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 579i
(majority) ; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. (1925) § 1387 (four-fifths).
"Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148
(i919) ; Lane & Co. v. Maple Cotton Mills, 226 Fed. 692 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1915) ;
Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. II, 12o Atl. 486
(1923) and comment thereon in (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 436.
'Koehler v. St. Mary's Brewing Co., supra note 2; In re Timmis, supra
note 8; Wall v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 216 Fed. 242 (D. C. D. Mont.
1914).
"See discussion of equity powers in 6 FLErcHE, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 3997; BERLE, LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928) 46 et seq.; HARVEY,
RIGHTS OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS (2d ed. 1929) 45 et seq. In Delaware,
the situs of the instant case, where the corporation code (DEL. REV. CODE
(i915) c. 65), and particularly its recent revisions (Act of March 2, 1927;
Act of March 22, 1929), have tended to grant corporate controlling interests
a series of absolute powers affecting the property rights of shareholders, equity
has nevertheless protected minority stockholders against oppression and unfair
dealing. See discussion by Cades in (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 256, of Davis
v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., r42 Atl. 654 (Del. 1928), decided under the 1927
revision; Berle, Investors & the Revised Del. Corp. Act (1929) 19 COL. L.
REV. 563; Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. supra note IO; Bodell
v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., I5 Del. Ch. 119, 132 Atl. 442 (1926).
'OHIO

CONSTITUTION, ART. I, § i0.
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was paramount to the right of the defendant to counsel of his personal choice.
Ford v. State, 168 N. E. 139 (Ohio x929).
In ancient England, as in Greece and Rome, every suitor was obliged to
prosecute or defend his suit in person, unless special license was obtained.'
Later the rule developed that only a person accused of treason or felony was
not entitled to the right of defense by counsel except in the argument of a
question of law suggested by the accused 3
This rule was justified on the
theory that the judge acted as counsel for the prisoner, and that the evidence
upon which the accused was convicted was always so clear that no defense
was possible, and, therefore, no counsel was needed.
In England it was not
until 1836 that a prisoner was permitted to have the benefit of counsel in all
criminal prosecutions while in the United States the right to counsel has been
granted not only by the Federal Constitution,6 but also by the constitutions of
many states. The courts have always given utmost protection to this right to
counsel, and, if possible, have permitted the accused to make his own selection.'
The right of personal choice of counsel, however, is not absolute. Thus the
accused is not entitled to a continuance until the return of an attorney whom
he has not as yet employed to defend him,' or until his counsel who has been imprisoned for contempt of court will be released! Where counsel has failed
to appear and such absence is either unexplained or due to engagement in other
professional duties, it is not error to deny a continuance until that attorney
will be able to attend,"0 especially if the accused is ably represented by other
counsel already employed by himu or the court appoints competent counsel to
23 BL. CoMM. *25; I THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW (0914)

§ 4.

HAWKINS, PL.as OF THE CROWN (8th ed. 1824) c. 39, §§ I, 4; 1 COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 698.
45 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1924)
192. For sound argument showing fallacy of reasoning see Stockton, The Practice of not Allowing
Counsel to Prisoners Accused of Felmy (1826) 45 Edinburgh Rev. 74.
'6 & 7 WILLIAM IV, c. 114 (1836) defense by counsel permitted in all
cases of felony; 7 WILLIAr III, c. 3 (1696) allowing counsel to persons on
trial for high treason.
6
U. S. CONSTITUTION, Sixth Amendment. See Perkins v. Sheriff, 23 F.
(2d) 892 (W. D. La. 1927).
'Jackson v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 79, 155 S. W. 262 (1po8) ; see Smith v.
United States, 288 Fed. 259 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1923). The accused, if
mentally competent and sni juris, has a right to conduct his defense in person
and the services of an attorney cannot be forced upon him. Williams v. State,
163 Ark. 623, 239 S. W. io65 (924) ; Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 136 N. W.
166 (1912).
'Magruder v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 465, 84 S. W. 587 (1904).
' People v. Warren, 130 Cal. 678, 63 Pac. 87 (I9OO).
10 Brickey v. State, 148 Ark. 595, 231 S. W. 549 (1921) ; People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328, Ig Pac. 161 (1888) ; State v. Pico, 116 Wash. 279, 199 Pac.
289 (192i). Statutory provision in some states requires that a continuance be
granted where counsel is absent as a member of the legislature. State v.
Parker, 144 La. 212, 80 So. 258 (I918) ; State v. Clark, 214 Mo. App. 536, 262
S. W. 413 (1923).
"People v. Swan, 188 Cal. 759, 207 Pac. 386 (1922) ; Childs v. State, 273
Pac. ioi6 (Okla. 1929); Paulk v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. 174, 296 S. W. 588
*2

(927).
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protect the rights of the accused during the course of the trial.' Courts justify
this position on The basis that an unlimited right to insist upon continuances
to suit the convenience of counsel in fulfilling other engagements, would place
it in the power of counsel to control the running of the courts, and subject
the time and services of the court, jury, and witnesses to the wishes and interests of the attorney for the accused. Where, on the other hand, counsel
selected by the accused is the only one familiar with the case so that
in his absence the rights of the accused would be prejudiced and a fair trial
could not result, a reasonable continuance should be granted to permit that
particular counsel to be present." Courts do not favor continuances because
of the resulting delay and inconvenience and if, therefore, as in the principal
case, the accused can be ably defended by counsel other than those selected by
him, a continuance should not be granted to permit him to be defended by counsel
of personal choice.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY

OF EVIDENCE

OF DEFFNDANT'S

REPUTATAON-

One of the defense witnesses in a criminal case, after having testified that he
had known the defendant for five years and employed him for two, was asked,
"Do you know his reputation as a law-abiding citizen?" An objection by the
prosecution was interposed and sustained, and the defendant on appeal urged

that the exclusion of this evidence was error. Held, that the question as to
the witness' knowledge of the defendant's reputation as a law-abiding citizen
was properly excluded since it failed to specify the time of the reputation,
and was not confined to the reputation of the defendant in the neighborhood
in which he lived or among his associates. People v. Rembosicz et al., 167
N. E. 797 (Ill. 1929).
Our legal system permits a man's character to be brought into the evidence
either for the purpose of affecting his credibility as a witness,' or, in criminal
cases as here, to aid in the demonstration of the innocence of the accused.'
The evidence by which character is proven is the same in both instances, and
is confined to testimony as to the general reputation of the person in question.'
2

Delk v. State, 99 Ga. 667, 26 S. E. 752 (1896); State v. Pico, supra note

io. Contra: Lotta v. State, 235 Pac. 245 (OkIa. 1925).
"'State v. Kerber, 172 App. Div. 755, 159 N. Y. Supp. 215 (1916); Scott
v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 6io, 68 S. W. 171 (902).

'Knode v. Williamson, 17 Wall. 586 (U. S. 1873); Boon v. Weathered's
Adm'r, 23 Tex. 675 (1859).
'Edgington v. U. S., 164 U. S. 361 (1896) ; Cancemi v. People, i6 N. Y.
501 (858) ; 4 CHAMBERLAYNE, TM&TIS - ON EVIDENCE (913)
§ 3274. The
prosecution may not initially attack the defendant's character, but may rebut
after the defendant has introduced evidence. Regina v. Rowton, 7 C: & P. 520
(1865) ; 2 JONES, COimrlTARIES ox EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) § 641.
'Waddingham v. Hulett, 92 Mo. 528, 5 S. W. 27 (1887). This eliminates
testimony as to witness' opinion of defendant, or as to specific acts of the
defendant which might tend to show his character.
Note distinction between character and reputation.

".

.

.

character re-

fers to what a person actually is, and reputation is what is said of him by his
neighbors." State v. Pickett, 202 Iowa 1321, 21o N. W. 782 (1926) ; see also
Note (1907) 3 WASr. L. REv. 33.
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There is the distinction, however, that in attacking or supporting the credibility
of a witness, it is his reputation for veracity and that alone which is in issue;'
whereas in the other instance the testimony which is introduced is limited to a
consideration of the trait or traits impugned in the alleged commission of the
crime. ' In addition, the further qualifications have always been laid down,
that the reputation testified to must be that which is current, (1), in the community in which the man resides, and, (2), prior to or at the time of the
alleged crime. The application of these rules would exclude evidence of a
man's reputation, either outside his immediate neighborhood, or subsequent to
the act alleged; and although they are admittedly well-sustained by the
authorities," it is submitted that they are difficult to justify on principle. For
example, under the narrow concept which the former qualification assumes,
courts have excluded evidence of the defendant's reputation among his fellow
workmen,' among his associates in a custom house,' and even among the "lawabiding people of the neighborhood".9 Yet the man's character is the same in
one place as in another. And furthermore, under the modern conditions existing in our large municipalities, a man is quite likely to be unknown to his
neighbors so that his only opportunity for establishing a reputation may exist
in his outside activities."
Likewise, the exclusion of the reputation of the
defendant after the act alleged, would seem doubtful. The reason assigned
for this rule is that unfounded rumors are too likely to be current after the
fact of the crime is made public, with the result that the former safeguards
of trustworthiness are lacking." Since, however, the rule was clearly established to prevent evidence of a hostile and prejudicial nature, it would seem
that a party fortunate enough to maintain a good reputation, though accused,
should be able to invoke the same to his aid. The instant case is to be noted
not because of any tendency shown to depart from the rigidity of the old
common law requirements, but rather for its restatement of the old rules of
evidence which have been a part of our law from the earliest times. It would
'Atwood v. Impson, 2o N. J. Eq. 157 (1869); Commonwealth v. Payne,
Pa. 101, 54 Atl. 489 (19o3); Noel v. Dickey, 3 Bibb 269 (814).
Any
other trait is relevant only insofar as it involves the presence or absence of
this quality as to truth telling. 2 WIosMOE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 922.

205

'State v. Thompson, 58 Utah 291, i99 Pac. 161 (I92i) ; State v. Popa,
56 Mont. 587, 185 Pac. 1114 (1919) ; Cripe, Character Evidence in Crininal
Cases, (1928) 3 IND. L. REV. 706.

0 (1) Waddingham v. Hulett, supra note 3; People v. Rodrigo, 69 Cal.
6oi, ii Pac. 481 (1886) ; UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1923) § 140.
(2) State v. Dolliver, 15o Minn. 155, 184 N. W. 848 (1921); Shewalter
v. Bergman, 123 Ind. 155, 23 N. E. 686 (1889).
"Sacrini v. U. S., 38 App. D. C. 371 (1912) ; State v. Brady, 71 N. J. L.
360, 59 Atl. 6 (19o4).

sWilliams v. U. S., 168 U. S. 382, 18 Sup. Ct. 92 (1897).
Watson v. State, 181 Ala. 53, 61 So. 334 (1913).
"People v. Colantone, 243 N. Y. 134, 152 N. E. 700 (1926); (1926)
COL. L. REv. 896; WmtoR, opus cit. supra note 4, § 1616.
' See note 6 (2) supra, and WIGMOR
opus cit. supra note 4, § 1618.
'WIGMORE,
opus cit. supra note 4, § 1618.
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seem that the court might well have used this opportunity to take its stand
in favor of a more liberal interpretation on this matter, even though the result
in this case would have been to reverse the judgment of the lower court.
EVIDENcE-ADMISSIBILITY OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIO-IDENTIFICATION
OF ANTIPHONAL SPEAKER-Plaintiff sues for damages caused by defendant's
son. Plaintiff called defendant's listed phone number through a central station '
and person answering admitted he was defendant. The conversation related
to the damage and closed with defendant saying he would call later. Held,
that the above facts make a prima fade case of identity. Epperson v. Rostatter,
168 N. E. 126 (Ind. 1929).
Courts have been constantly called upon to admit or reject evidence based
upon the widespread use of the telephone as a method of communication. A
2
conversation taking place over the telephone is admissible provided the identity
3
Identification is governed by somewhat
of the opposite party is established
different rules depending on which party to the phone conversation is to be
identified. The mere statement by the calling party that he is A lacks the first
essential of identification, as any individual disguising as A would have found
it equally easy to make the telephonic connection. The conversation, therefore.
may not be related' as that of A without further supporting evidence. When
the witness states he knew the antiphonal speaker by recognition of his voice,
it is generally conceded that this is a sufficient identification.' In the absence
of voice recognition, the identity of the caller may be proved by the variant
circumstances of the individua! case occurring before or after the conversation.' The speaker's knowledge or familiarity with previous transactions as
well as the very subject matter of the conversation may likewise be sufficient
to establish identity.' The converse situation, in which the witness makes the
call and the other party is to be identified, is at the outset more reliable, due
to the fact that the call is directed to a particular place coupled with the
'For a case where the telephone system used was the "automatic", see
Fidelity Oil & Gas Co. v. Janse Drilling Co., 27 D. L. R. 651 (1916). For a
case where "long-distance" was involved, Midlin v. Adams Co., 100 S. C. 359,
84 S. E. 867 (1915).

2 Shawyer v. Chamberlain, 113 Iowa 742, 84 N. W. 66I (i9oo) ; Lord Electric Co. v. Morril, 178 Mass. 304, 59 N. E. 807 (igoi); Wolfe v. R.R. Co., 97
Mo. 473, II S. W. 49 (1889).

'Lord Electric Co. v. Morril, supra note 2; Globe Printing Co. v. Stahl,
23 Mo. App. 451 (1886).
'Commonwealth v. Harris, 232 Mass. 588, 122 N. E. 749 (1919) ; Miller v.
Kelly, 215 Mich. 254, 183 N. W. 717 (1921); Dunham v. McMichael, 214 Pa.
485, 63 AtI. OO7 (19o6) ; 4 WIVMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) § 2155. Contra: Kansas City Pub. Co. v. Standard Co., 123 Mo. App. 13, 99 S. W. 765 (907).
'Lord Electric Co. v. Morril, supra note 2; Nat. Bank of Ashland v.
; Johnsen v. Hernig, 48 Pa. Super.
Cooper, 86 Neb. 792, 126 N. W. 656 (19)
484 (1912); 4 WIGUORE, EVIDENCE § 2155.
'Tabor Coal Co. v. Cohen, 189 Il1. App. 190 (1914); Deering v. Shumpkin,
67 Minn. 348, 69 N. W. io88 (i9o7) ; People v. McKane, 143 N. Y. 445, 38 N. E.
950 (1894) ; State v. Peterson, log Wash. 25, 186 Pac. 264 (1919).
'People v. Herman, 49 Cil. App. 592, 193 Pac. 868 (12) ; Commonwealth
v. Turner, 224 Mass. 229, 112 N. E. 864 (1916).
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ordinary success of the telephone system in securing the desired number. Two
situations should here be distinguished: (I) when an office or place of business
is to be identified, a primna facie identification is made by evidence that the
listed phone number was called plus the admission of the person responding
that the correct connection had been made.8 These cases are the most frequent
in commercial litigation, and courts have been libfral in requirements for
identification. (2) When an individual is to be identified the tendency is to
require some evidence of such identity in addition to that required to identify
his office or place of business.' In this latter class the courts are more strict in
requiring actual identification. Here again the additional circumstances preceding or following the communication may aid in establishing identity.'
The
instant case presents a problem falling into the second classification. The
court, however, seems to have considered only such facts as would be required
to establish identity under the first classification. The conclusion, nevertheless,
appears proper in view of the fact that additional evidence, which the trend
of authority would require to make a prima facie case of identity of person,
was present. The realization that the telephone may be a convenient instrumentality of fraud is an important factor to be considered in the cases dealing
with this problem.

INJUNcTIONS--LABOR

DISPUTES '-RIGHTS

OF

EMPLOYER

TO

ENJOIN

AREA-The
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, the union controlling labor in the
clothing industries of New York and other states, sent representatives to Philadelphia to organize strikes by peaceful means in complainants' factories, since a
non-union market so close at hand seriously threatened the safety of the New
York industry and consequently of the national union, by competing in interstate commerce with lower priced merchandise made possible by cheaper labor.
Complainants, Philadelphia manufacturers, bring action to enjoin such interference by representatives of the national union. Held, that defendant's acts
are in restraint of interstate competition in violation of the Sherman Act, that
even at common law they are without justification and thus illegal, and that,
EFFORTS OF NATIONAL UNION TO INCITE STRIKES IN NoN-UNION

8
Godair v. Ham. Nat. Bank, 225 Ill. 572, 8o N. E. 407 (1907) ; Theisen v.
Detroit Taxicab Co., 2oo Mich. 136, 166 N. V. 9Ol (1918) ; Wolfe v. R. R. Co.,
Sipra note 2 (see criticism of this case 3 WArIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2155 n. 7).
Contra: Bonner Mfg. v. Tannenbaum, 169 N. Y. Supp. 43 (i918); Young v.
Seattle Transfer Co., 33 Wash. 225, 74 Pac. 399 (903).
'Stewart v. Fisher, IS Ga. App. 519, 89 S. E. 1052 (1916) ; Obermann
Brewing Co. v. Adams, 35 Ill. App. 540 (18go); Kimbark v. Illinois Car Co.,
IO3 Ill. App. 632 (I9O2); Swing v. Walker, 27 Pa. Super. 366 (i9o5). Contra: Globe Printing Co. v. Stahl, supra note 3 (directory showed that defendant
had two phones at distant places).
" Cases supra in notes 6 and 7.

For excellent summary of American law on labor questions, see Frankfurter and Greene, Tniunctions in American Labor Controversies (1928) 44
L. Q. REV. 164 (substantive law); ibid. 353 (use of injunction); (1929) 45
ibid. i9 (labor legislation).
- 26 STAT. 209 (1890),

15 U.

S.

C. § 1 (1926).
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therefore, the injunction will issue. Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, District Court of U. S. (E. D. Pa., Oct. 1929).
Since the now famous opinion of Chief Justice Holt fir st established the tests
of the motive of the participant and of the means used as the determinants of the
legality of labor combinations;' and even since, fifty years later, the Supreme
Court extended the jurisdiction of equity courts in labor controversies far
beyond any limits before permitted,' the decisions and expressions of opinion
on the law as applied to labor questions have run tne gamut of every possible
variation and distortion. Today there are almost as many attitudes taken by
courts toward particular labor questions as there are jurisdictions in this country.
However, the views of Massachusetts and of New York represent the two
extremes," and a study of them serves as something of a guide to the understanding of the attitude of American courts. The Massachusetts courtc takes
a very conservative stand, gravting injunctions against labor in the great majority
of instances, holding labor to a strict interpretation of "self-interest", justifying
only strikes by employees seeking higher wages, shorter hours, or improved shop
conditions, but declaring enjoinable, strikes called for purposes of unionization; '
the New York court adopts a very liberal view, looking to the means rather than
to the end, interpreting broadly the term "self-interest", and permitting almost
any strike, whether for better working conditions or for unionization, provided
the means be peaceful.0 The federal courts have in recent years leaned rather
toward the Massachusetts conservatism. The decision in the principal case seems
to fall directly in line with the prevailing view in the -United States Supreme
Court." It, however, constitutes the closest case yet decided, because of the
difficulty of determining the legally significant motive of the national labor union.
Once having decided, as this court does, that the primary purpose and object
of the defendants is to prevent shipment of goods produced by non-union labor
to markets of other states where it will by competition tend to reduce the price
of the commodity and affect injuriously the maintenance of wages for union
labor in competing fields, the result under federal procedure would seem clear.
The acts of the defendants then constitute restraint of interstate commerce under
the Second Coronado Case, which held that interference with production with
intent to control interstate commerce is restraint of interstate commerce.21 In
this regard, the principal case would seem to be to the Second Coronado Case
'Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. III (Mass. 1842).
'In rc Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 9o0 (i895).
For general discussion of the various views, see Frankfurter and Greene,
supra note 1, 44 at 68, 184, i86.
'Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1ol (9oo).
7Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfrs. Asso., 221 Mass. 554, tog N. E. 643
(1915).
6 Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, I16 N. E. 8ol (1917).
OExchange Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 26o, 157 N. E.
13o (1927) ; Note (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV. 88o.
" Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917);
Duplex v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1920).
I'Coronado v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct. 55I (1925).
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what tme Herkert case " was to the First Coronado Case,' that is, a crystallization of its theory and an application of its principle. In also basing its decision
in the instant case upon the second ground that, regardless of statutes concerning
interstate commerce, defendants may under common law rules be enjoined from
effecting strikes in plants of the plaintiffs even by peaceful persuasion, the court
would seem again to be in accord with the prevailing federal view." However,
the writer feels that the classic dissents of Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and
Clarke," holding that industrial combatants may lawfully push their struggle
to the limits of the justification of self-interest, and that the majority Supreme
Court view, if desirable at all, should have come as the result not of judicial
determination, but of legislative enactment are more in accordance with common
law principles. Under the view of these dissents, the interest of the defendants
in the instant case would be sufficient justification. It seems certain, however,
that when the principal case reaches the Circuit Court of Appeals for review,
it will be affirmed if the court follows federal precedents; and that should it
come before the Supreme Court of the United States, it will be affirmed once
more by concurrence of at least six members of that body, unless there is a
very definite change of attitude on their part. Justices Brandeis and Holmes,
and possibly Justice Stone, may be depended upo~i for a vigorous dissent-particularly upon the second ground of the decision in the principal case.
M[ORTGAGEs-EvIDENCE--PAROL
GRANTEE

EVIDENCE

TO

WHO TAKES CONVEYANCE SUBJECT TO

ESTABLISH

LIABILITY

MORTGAGE-Mortgagor

OF

sold

mortgaged land to defendant by a general warranty deed expressly reciting that
the conveyance was subject to deeds of trust. Mortgagee sues to recover a
deficiency arising from foreclosure. Held, inter alia, that parol evidence could
be introduced to show defendant's assumption of the mortgage. McFarland v.
Melson, 20 S. W. (2d) 63 (Mo. 1929),
It is a general principle that a deed subject to mortgage is not sufficient
of itself to make the grantee personally liable for the mortgage debt. Such a
deed operates solely as an incumbrance on the land.' Notwithstanding this, a
majority of courts permit the introduction of parol evidence to show an assump'United
Leather Workers' Union v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457, 44 Sup.
Ct. 623 (1924).
13 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U.
S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570
(1922).

" Supra note io.
" Duplex v. Deering; Hitchman Coal Co. v. M itchell, both sztpra note io.
'McArthur v. Goodwin, 173 Cal. 499, i6o Pac. 679 (x916) ; Lloyd v. Lowe,
63 Colo. 288, 165 Pac. 609 (1917) ; 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 933;
I WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE (4th ed. 1927) § 235. Pennsylvania has a
statute to this effect. Act of June 12, 1878, P. L. 205, § I, PA. STAT. (West,
1920) § 18854.
This statute is discussed in an excellent article by Corbin,
The Law of Third Party Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania (1928) 77 U. OF PA.
L. REv. I, 13.
=Fiske v. Tolman, 124 Mass. 254 (1878) ; Redhe-d v. Skidmore Land Co.,
194 Wis. 123, 215 N. V. 937 (1927).
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tion of the mortgage; ' but they arrive at this conclusion upon different grounds.
One group advances the theory that the parol agreement is an independent contract and is neither at Variance with the deed nor merged in it.' This view
cannot be sustained by sound legal reasoning, because if the contract is distinct
from the contract of sale, there is no consideration for the assumption and the
contract is void.' A second class of jurisdictions advances the theory that parol
evidence may be introduced to show that the assumption of the debt constitutes
part of the consideration.' This argument is fallacious because proof that the
mortgage has been assumed not only explains the consideration but in effect
changes the legal operation of the deed by inserting a new liability.- A third
theory, that advanced in the instant case, is that a stranger to a deed can introduce parol evidence to vary the writing on the theory that he has not assented
to the contract and should be free to show the true character of the transaction.'
However, the right of a stranger to vary a written instrument by parol evidence
applies only to rights independent of the contract and not to those which arise
from the transaction from which the deed issues.' Whether the mortgagee's
right to recover from the grantee is based on the third party beneficiary rule
followed in a majority of jurisdictions,"0 or on the equitable doctrine of subrogation which is followed by the minority," it would appear that since the mortgagee derives his right from the relationship between the mortgagor and the
grantee, the right is dependent on the deed and parol evidence should be excluded.'
'White v. Schader, 185 Cal. 6o6, 198 Pac. ig (1921 ; Brown v. Leeak, 52
N. D. 398, 203 N. W. 185 (1925); Note (927) 50 A. L. R. 1220. Contra:
Hicks v. Sullivan, 127 Miss. 148, 89 So. 811 (921).

'Gilmer v. Powell, 256 S. W. 124 (Mo. App. 1923); Ordway v. Downey,
x8 Wash. 412, 51 Pac. 1047 (1898).
'Ludlum v. Pinckard, 304 Ill. 449, 136 N. E. 725 (1922); Boyd v. Winte,
65 Okla. 141, 164 Pac. 781 (1917) ; 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note I, § 938.
6
Brosseau v. Lowy, 209 Ill. 405, 70 N. E. 9oi (19o4) ; Swarthout v. Shields,
I85 Mich. 427, 152 N. W. 202 (1915).
Contra: Wayne B. & L. Assn. v.
Beckner, 191 Ind. 664, 134 N. E. 273 (1922) ; see Lamoille Bank v. Belden, go
Vt. 535, 98 Atl. lOO2 (I916).
Wayne B. & L. Assn. v. Beckner, supra note 6; Hicks v. Sullivan, sutpra
note 3.
'Nissen v. Sabin, 202 Iowa 1362, 212 N. W. 125 (1927) ; Nebraska Wesleyan U. v. Smith, 113 Neb. 208, 202 N. W. 625 (1925).
Contra: Hood v.
Young, 178 Ark. 439, i S. W. (2d) 767 (1928).
'Schultz v. Plankinton Bank, 141 Ill. II6, 30 N. E. 346 (1892) ; 3 JONES,
COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) § 1488.
" Dean v. Walker, 107 Ill. 540 (1883) ; Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178 (1861);
The Home v. Selling, 91 Oxe. 428, 179 Pac. 261 (igig). Contra: Creesy v.

Willis, 159 Mass. 249, 34 N. E. 265 (893).
In Pennsylvania a statute prohibits one not a party to the agreement from suing even on an express assumption of liability. Act of June 12, 1878, P. L. 205, § 2, PA. STAT. (West, I920)
§ 18855. For a discussion of the right of the mortgagee to recover in Pennsylvania, see Note (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 791.
'Keller
v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 6Io, IO Sup. Ct. 494 (i8go); Green v.
Stone, 54 N. J. Eq. 387, 34 Atl. O99 (1896).
' Hood v. Young, supra note 8. This case held that the provision "subject
to" is contractual in nature, and the mortgagee, not a party to the contract,
has no rights under it except what the contract gives him.
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Furthermore, the mortgagee, by obtaining a lien on the land and the personal
liability of the mortgagor, has already received what he has bargained for and
should not be permitted to extend his rights by a rule which opens the door to
fraud and perjured testimony. The principal case marks a departure from strict
legal principles despite an adverse public policy which favors the exclusion
of parol evidence.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-INJUNCTIONS

TO

RESTRAIN

COUNCIL

FROMI

VIRES CONTRACTs-A citizen offered his town a war memorial
and museum on the condition that the electorate of the town should agree to
annually levy a special tax amounting to $55oo for its upkeep, and should direct
its council so to do. The electorate having voted favorably on the issue, taxpayers seek an injunction to restrain the council from accepting the gift on
the ground that the contract so formed would be idira %4res,and would bind
them in the future to pay an illegal tax. Held, that such an injunction will be
granted. Johnson v. Pendleton, 280 Pac. 873 (Ore. 1929).
Courts draw a sharp distinction between the governmental functions of a
municipal council such as passing laws, exercising police powers, and levying
taxes, on the one hand, and, on the other, its business functions such as contracting for public utilities, and providing generally for the welfare of its
inhabitants. In exercising power under the first group, it has been consistently
held that a council may not bind or in any way restrain its successors in office;
under the second group, it is equally certain that it may contract so as to bind
future councils either within a term of years provided for in its charter, or
for a reasonable time.' Even in this latter group, however, there is little doubt
2
that a contract in perpetuo is invalid, and into it the principal case would seemto fall; for while directly levying a tax is undoubtedly a governmental function,'
the provision o~f the amount to be raised for the upkeep of a museum is more
naturally a business one.' Granting the ultra vires nature of the contract proposed, however, the court in this case suggests that if an injunction were refused and the contract actually executed on one side by the gift of the museum,
the municipality would be bound forever to carry out its side of the agreement.
Aside from the fact that such a ruling would, in effect, grant to the council
powers which the very basis of the suit denies, it is difficult to reconcile the
MAKING ULTRA

'Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 147 Fed. I (C. C. A. 8th, 19o6); and cases
collected in notes under 16 L. R. A. 257 (I892), 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 652 (19o9).
'Boise City v. Artesian Water Co., 186 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911);
State v. Minn. Transfer Co., 8o Minn. lO8, 83 N. W. 32 (9oo) ; Brick Pres.
Church v. City of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N. Y. 1826). Contra: Belfast v.
Belfast Water Co., 115 Me. 234, 98 Atl. 738 (1916) ; Atlantic City Water Works
v. Atlantic City, 48 N. J. L. 378, 6 Atl. 24 (1886). In Robbins v. County Comm.,
5o Col. 61o, 115 Pac. 126 (1911) a bequest for the erection of a hospital was
conditioned upon the town's binding itself to perpetually support it. The
condition was held impossible of fulfillment, and the bequest consequently void.
'In Westminster Water Co. v. Westminster, 98 Md. 551, 56 At. 999 (19o4)
the court held a contract to pay the proceeds of a set rate annual tax void.
' For an interesting discussion of the power of a municipality to spend public
funds for memorials see GEORGE G. BATTLE: The Power of a M'unicpality etc.,
(1924)

10 VA.

L.

REV. 417.

RECENT CASES
dicta with the great number of cases which decide that where no injunction
has beforehand been sought and the consideration of an ultra vires contract
executed on one side, the other Will not be bound to carry out its entire agreement, but that the courts will seek to give justice and force the other party
to pay for benefits received by binding it for a reasonable time.' Whatever
remedies the court may be required to adopt to make the best of the situation
once the contract has been partially executed, there seems to be no reason
why it should not avoid the whole difficulty by granting an injunction at the
start. Such a method of restraining its governing body is commonly used by
business corporations,' and at least one jurisdiction has hitherto extended it to
Such a premunicipal corporations in cases similar to the principal one.
ventive action gives the parties a chance to make a new contract on a legal
basis if they so desire, and makes for more effective law and better justice than
any possible remedial measure.
PROPERTY-FUTURE

INTERESTS-VILLS-TIME

AT WHICH

"DIE

WITHOUT

THEREONTestator's will gave to her husband a life estate, then provided that at his death
the estate should be divided between her son and A, her daughter; the will
further provided that in case of the decease of A without leaving lawful issue,
then "I devise her share to B". The husband died and the son and A are living;
A has no issue. The son and A seek specific performance by the defendant of
his contract to buy the estate; the defense is A cannot convey a fee simple.
Held, that "death without issue" here means within the lifetime of the lifetenant, therefore A has a fee absolute. Seeley et al. v. Munger et ux., 297 Pa.
283, 146 Atl. 892 (1929).
At common law in a devise "to A outright, and if he die without issue, gift
over to B", the words "die without issue" were given their literal meaning
thereby effecting a gift over only on an indefinite failure of issue of the first
taker, which failure may not take place for hundreds of years.' Under this
construction of the meaning of "die without issue' the devise operated as a
fee-tail,' since there was given a fee, contingent on the existence of issue; and
ISSUE IS EFFECTIVE WHERE THERE IS A GIFT OVER- CONTINGENT

*East Oakland v. Skinner, 94 U. S. 255 (1876); Swift v. Williamsby, 24
Barb. 427 (N. Y. 1857); Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 107 Tenn. 647, 64
S. W. 1075 (0goi).

'Hitchccck v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341 (1877); Columbus Water Co. v.
Columbus, 48 Kan. 99, 28 Pac. io97 and cases reviewed thereunder.
" Maunsell v. Midland R. R. Co., I Hem. & Mill. 130, 31 Eng. Reprints 58
(870) ; Manderson v. Bank, 28 Pa. 379

413
(1863) ; Bradley v. Ballard, 55 Ill.

(1857).
'Gusthal v. Strong, 83 Fed. 856 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1897); Ziegler v.
Chapin, 126 N. Y. 342, 27 N. E. 471 (i89I); Norris v. Wurston, 23 N. Y. 124,
43 N. E. 656 (i897).
'Lee's Case, I Leon. 285 (Eng. 1583); Cole v. Goble, 13 C. B. 445 (Eng.
1853) ; THEOBALD, WILLS (8th ed. 1927) 8o0; (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 512.
'Chadock v. Cowley, Cro. Jac. 695 (Eng. 1621); Turril v. Northrop, 51
Conn. 33 (z883); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY (Am. L. Inst. 1929)
§ 103, showing present status of all the states; I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
(2nd ed. i92o) 65.
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this was the only way it could operate, because giving a fee simple and an
executory devise over, which postponed estate would not vest until an indefinite
time in the future, would be invalid under the Rule against Perpetuities.3 By
construing the estate an estate-tail the perpetuity rule is not involved since
the vesting of the future estate must occur immediately on the termination of
the fee-tail created by the same instrument and the tenant of the fee-tail can at
any time preclude the possibility of vesting in the ultimate taker named.' The
classic interpretation of issue as "indefinite" ceased to be applied after the passage of the Wills Act' in England; the words "die without issue" being construed to mean death as of the time of the death of A, the first taker of a fee
interest. This interpretation is the law in England and many of the states, being
recognized as the reasonable, ordinary and unrestricted meaning of the words
used.' Where statutes have changed fees-tail into fees-simple' and the English
rule is followed, there is no difficulty with the perpetuity rule because the gift
over must take place at the end of a life which was in eyse at the time the instrument took effect. Having disposed of the "indefinite" construction by statute,
some courts sought a basis for an even earlier vesting than is realized by the
"definite" rule. At common law a gift "to A, at his death to B" created a life
estate in A, remainder to B; ' a gift "to A, if he die then to B" created a fee simple absolute in A, upon his surviving the testator." Death being a certain event
reference to it as a contingency could only be construed to mean uncertainty
as to the time of its occurrence, hence the interpretation was that the testator
intended that B should be substituted for A to prevent a lapse if A died before
the testator. With a leaning toward early vesting of estates the court in the
principal case, and other courts, extended this interpretation by making an
analogy where the gift was "to A, if he die without issue, then to B", holding
"die" meant death before the testator."0 This analogy, however, is inapt, since
death zithout issue is the contingency and there is no logical basis for inferring
that time of death is the contingency." It would follow then that these words
THE LAW OF PERPETUITY (1843) 186.
' Basis for this is that tenant in fee-tail may at any time, by common recovery
or by conveyance in fee-simple, as provided by statute, destroy the limitation so
that it is in effect nonexistent as to him. The limitation being exclusively in the
control of one who has an existing estate in the land, may be regarded as a mere
appurtenance to such estate for purposes of the rule. TIFFANY, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 184. Goodwin v. Clark, I Lev. 35 (Eng. I66I) ; Barber v. Pittsburgh,
Ft. W. & C. R. Co., i66 U. S. 83, I7 Sup. Ct. 488 (1897).
CI Vic. Ch. 26 §28 (Eng. 1837) ; Edwards v. Edwards, I5 Beav. 357 (Eng.
'LEwIs,

1852), was the leading case based on the Wills Act. See infra note 15.
'Ahlfield v. Curtis, 229 Ill. 139, 82 N. E. 276 (19o7) ; Smith v. Ballard, 117
Ky. 179, 77 S. W. 714 (1903) ; Britton v. Thornton, 112 U. S. 526, 5 Sup. Ct.
291

(1884).
Act of Apr. 27, 1855, P. L. 368, § I, PA. SrAT. (West, 192o) § 10256.

' Constable v. Bull, 3 De G. & S. 411 (Eng. 1849); THEOBALD, WILLS (7th
ed. 19o8) 658.
'Lord Bindon v. Earl of Suffolk, I P. ,Vms. 96 (Eng. 1707); THEOBALD,
loc. cit. supra note 8.
0 Seewald's Estate, 281 Pa. 483, 127 Atl. 63 (1924) ; Fowler v. Duhme, 143
Ind. 248, 42 N. E. 625 (1896) ; Washbon v. Cope, 144 N. Y. 287, 39 N. E. 388
(1895).
2' KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS (2nd ed. I920) § 65.
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should be given their usual meaning, "die" would then be death at any time.
A desire to give the benefit to the main object of the grantor's bounty, to vest
estates as early as possible, to avoid repugnancy by refusing to cut a fee-simple
down to a fee-tail, or life estate, are the reasons courts limit the determination
of the estate to the end of the testator's life.'
Jurisdictions following the
English rule criticise this "substitutionary" rule as an adding of words to the
instrument, and a perversion of the testator's intent.' Both rules give way to
the slightest suggestion of an expression in the ilstrument of a definite intent.1 '
Where a preceding life-estate exists, as in the principal case, courts to avoid an
even greater postponement of vesting interpret "die" to mean death within the
life-time of the holder of the intermediate estate. This view is not attained by
any analogy to thp previous two situations, but is itself regarded as a better
realization of the testator's intent. Such is the holding in this country even
where the English rule is followed where there is no intermediate estate."
TAXATION-ExEMPTION FROm FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME RECEIVED FROm

petitioner, Reed, was appointed
by the Attorney General of Pennsylvania to represent the Commonwealth in
several suits to collect the state inheritance tax and to test the constitutionality
of the statute under which the tax was imposed. No important questions of policy
were decided in those suits without consultation with the Attorney General.
For these services, the State paid Reed $25oo, which amount he did not include
in his tax return for that year. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the
petitioner was an independent contractor, and this income, taxable. Reed
appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Held, that the petitioner was an
employee of the State and that the compensation was not taxable. Reed v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 34 F. (2nd) 263 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1929).
In holding that the petitioner was an employee of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, this Circuit Court of Appeals has made the first move toward
securing a reversal of the federal rule that only he is an "employee" whose
services are continuous, and are not occasional or temporary.! The logic of the
A STATE FOR SERVICES AS SPECIAI COUNSEL-The

(1920) 4 MINN. L. REV. 375; 2 PAGE, WILLS (2nd ed. 1926) § 114o; as
to which is the majority view there is much confusion. Cf. ibid. with KALES,
loc. cit. supra note II.
O'Mahoney v. Burdett, L. R. 7 H. L. 388 (Eng. 1875).
4
tnre Ryder, 43 Misc. 476, 89 N. Y. Supp. 460 (19o4) ; Collins v. Coll;ns,
116 Iowa 703, 88 N. W. lO97 (19o2).
'Thackston v. Watson, 84 Ky.206, I S. W. 398 (1886) ; Stark's Estate,
264 Pa. 232, io7 Atl. 699 (igig) ; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 166; WALSH,
THE LAW OF PROPERTY (2nd ed. I927) 515; (1925) 13 Ky. L. J. 172;
Edwards v. Edwards, supra note 5, was the leading English case for several
years, holding that ifthere is a life tenancy preceding, the court leans against a
construction that would suspend the time of vesting. This qualification was discarded by O"lvfahoney v. Burdett, supra note 13, as indulging in a forced presumption at the expense of the natural meaning of the expression. The
O'Mahoney case is now the leading English case on the subject.

'Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis R. R. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 5Ol, ii Sup.
Ct. 405 (189o) ; Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172
(1926) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 643 on the Income Tax under Revenue Act
of 1928; HOLMES, FEDERAL TAXES (6th ed. 1925) 539.
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departure is apparent. The existence of the employment should be ascertained
not by the duration, but rather by the nature of the services and the relation of
the parties.! The decision, in this respect, while thus supported in reason, has
little foundation in precedent.3 As authority for its holding, the court has cited
but two cases, the second one' of which was decided entirely upon the former,'
while the former case itself is not one in which temporary services were held to
constitute employment, nor does it cite any cases so holding. However, if placed
upon the fundamental Constitutional limitation that compensation paid to the
agencies or instrumentalities of a state for services rendered in the exercise
of an essential governmental function is not taxable by the federal government,
the decision appears sound in logic and precedent.' Since upon the right and
power of a state to tax depends its existence, the services of the petitioner in the
collection of the state inheritance tax and the testing of the constitutionality of
the statute constituted him pro tanto a state agency 7 Inasmuch as effect could
have been given to this principle of exemption without subscribing to the
formula requiring one claiming immunity to be an "officer or an employee of a
state",' the necessity for classifying the petitioner as an employee is doubtful.
Though the above mentioned doctrine of exemption of state agencies or instrumentalities from federal taxation has been questioned in occasional and well
reasoned dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court,' it has been the established
law since the opinion of Marshall, C. J., in McCidloch v. Maryland. Our dual
system of government with its necessary and reciprocal limitation of powers
appears to justify the doctrine and the decision of this case." The opinion of
the court presents one other interesting phase. The Board of Appeals had held,
2 Gurney et al. v. Atlantic & G. W. Ry. Co., 58 N. Y. 358 (1874); Note
38 HARV. L. REV. 793; 1 MECnEh, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §§ 25 et seq.
'Supra note i.
' Howard v. Commissioner, 29 F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928).
'Blair v. Matthews, 29 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 5th, '928).
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 36 (1819); Collector v.

(1925)

Day, II Wall. 113, 78 U. S. 113 (1870). The revenue acts of 1913, 1916, and
1917 specifically exempted salaries of state officers and employees. No such
exemption is found in the acts of I918, 1921, and I924. However, Sec. 1211 of
Revenue Act of 1926 (26 U. S. C. A. § io65B.) contained a retroactive clause

of exemption.
'Suprc note 6. The decisions of the Department of Internal Revenue have
been conflicting: I. T. i8go, III-i C. B. 116 (1923) (income of special investigator, taxable). Cf. I. T. 1316, I-I C. B. lO5 (1922).
8
U. S. Treas. Reg. .rupra note i. For rulings under earlier statutes, see Reg.
62, Art. 88; Reg. 65, Art. 88.
0Bradley, J., in Collector v. Day, supra note 8, at 128, 78 U. S. at 128;
Holmes, J. in Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 550, 557 (919).

"But this court which has so often defeated an attempt to tax in a certain way
can defeat an attempt to discriminate or otherwise go too far without wholly
abolishing the power to tax. The power to tax is not the power to destroy while
this court sits."
'Svpra note 6.
'Panhandle Oil Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451
(1927) and cases cited supra note 6. 2 CooLEY, CoNsTrrUTIONAL LImITATIONS
(8th ed. 1927) 995; Note (1925)

73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 419-

RECENT CASES
and the government on appeal had contended that the petitioner had been an
independent contractor. Since the relation of attorney and client is essentially
one of agency,' and, since the evidence clearly showed that the Attorney General
retained the power of control ;n these four suits wherein the petitioner represented
the Commonwealth,' the court was clearly correct in rejecting the theory of an
independent contractorship. It failed to follow this, however, with a conclusion
based on the doctrine o~f McCulloch v. Maryland. In result the decision of the
case is unquestionable, though the opinion is somewhat weakened by the basis
upon which it is made to rest.
TAXATION-PRoFIT DExavED FRom TAX-EXEMPT MUNICIPAL BoNDs-Appellee, under protest, paid federal income tax on profits realized from sale of
tax-exempt municipal bonds. - Held, that such profits are tax-exempt. Willcuts,
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Bunn, C. C. A. 8th, No. 8565 (Minn. 1929).
The Federal Income Tax Act provides that: "Interest upon the obligations
shall not be taxof a State, Territory or any political subdivision thereof .
able under the Act. Thus, only such income as paid directly by the state to the
bond-holder is exempted specifically by the Act and such income as is derived
from profit made by the sale of a bond can only be tax-exempt if the tax can
be brought within the rule of McCulloch v. Maryland,' as interfering with a
governmental function. Though the rule referred to has been strictly applied in
cases dealing with a property tax upon'the principal of a government bond,'
there has been a decided tendency to limit its application to such taxes as the
rule was originally intended to prevent, namely those which are so direct as
to possess the power to control the very existence of the function or- agency.3
The Supreme Court has expressly reserved to its own discretion the right to
apply the rule,' and has further held that it will not be applied where the interference caused by the tax is remote It would seem evident that the desirable
features of a government bond, federal or state, are the exemption of principal
for purposes of property taxation, and of interest for that of income tax; that

' Putnam v. Day, 22 Wall. 60, 89 U. S. 6o (1876) ; In re Cooperative Law
Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (igio) ; 2 MECHEM, AGENCY (2nd ed. 1914)
§ 2150.

'Singer

Mfg. Co. v. Rahm, 132 U. S. 518, io Sup. Ct. 175 (1889) ; Chicago,

Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. Bond, 240 U. S. 449, 36 Sup. Ct. 403 (1915).
MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 40, 2150.

2

'4Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
2 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 583; 15 Sup. Ct.

673, 690 (1894).
'See Powell, Indirect Encr6achment on Federal Authority by the Taxin.q
Powers of the States, 31 HARv. L. REV. 321 and 721; see also note (1928) 77
U. OF PA. L. REV. 115.

'Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172 (1925).
'National Bank v. Com., 9 Wall. 353, 362 (U. S. 1869); Union Pacific
R. R. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 30, 31 (1873); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1910).
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the taxing of profit derived from, a sale of the bond has in the past placed no
great hardship upon states in their financing is evident from the fact that no
state has as yet objected to the levy. Thus the question: are the consequences
of such a tax too remote as an interference with state financing to merit judicial
relief? A bond is essentially a contract, hence two recent decisions of the
Supreme Court would seem somewhat analogous, and in each profits derived from
a contract with a state or federal agency were held taxable. In Metcalf & Eddy
z. Mitchell6 the contract called for the erection and repair of state buildings,
while in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Penna' the tax was imposed upon premiums
derived from surety bonds issued to governmental employees as required by
statute. It is obvious that in the above two instances the governmental agency
must eventually pay the tax through higher cost of the services rendered, which
would make the tax more direct than that under consideration where no extra
burden is put upon the state; and it cannot well be argued that the economical
expenditure of governmental funds is of less importance than the economical
borrowing thereof. Thus the decision reached in the principal case would seem
to be questionable by analogy at least, and doubtful insofar as it considers the
8
tax in question a direct interference with a governmental function.

TRUSTS-CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF STATUTE TAXING THE SETTLOR FOR INCOIE

FROM A REvocArx TRUsT-The plaintiff, in 1922, created a. trust, the it/come
of which was to be paid to his wife. At her death the principal was to go to
the plaintiff's children. The plaintiff reserved to himself the right to revoke,
alter or modify, in any manner, the trust indenture. The income for the year
t924 was paid to the beneficiary but the !laintiff, the settlor, in accordance with
a federal statute' was taxed upon it and sued to recover the tax paid on the
grounds that the statute was unconstitutional and retroactive as to a trust created
before its enactment. Held, that the statute was constitutional and not retroactive. Corliss z. Bowers, 34 F. (2d) 656 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
As a general rule, although a power of revocation is reserved in a trust
Therefore, from the time
indenture, the trust is perfectly valid until revoked
6 Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, supra note 4.

'Fidelity

& Deposit Co. of Md. v. Pa., 24o U. S. 319, 36 Sup. Ct. 298

(1915).
8

The peculiar nature of a bond should also be noted. An increase in the
price of a bond over its face value is not due to any increase in the amount
of interest or principal payable, but is due, primarily, to outside influences such
as a decreasing commodity price level or an increase in supply of surplus available for investment. The argument might be made with some force that the
profit does not arise out of the bond which is tax exempt.
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STAT. 277 (924), 26 U. S. C. §960 (g) (1928).
'Schreyer v. Schreyer, ioi App. Div. 465, 91 N. Y. Supp. io65 (1905),
aff'd 182 N. Y. 555, 75 N. E. 1134 (19o5) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Gardner,
161 N. E. 8oi (Mass. 1928); Cramer v. Hartford Conn. Trust Co., 147 Atl.
139 (Conn. 1929) ; I PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 1O4.
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the trust is created until it is revoked the legal estate is vested in the trustee '
and the equitable estate in the beneficiary.' And if the settlor dies without revoking the trust, the majority view is that transfer taxes need not be paid on such
property, the absolute character of the transfer at the time the trust was created
It is
not being affected by the mere reservation of a power of revocation
evident, therefore, that the corpus does not continue as the property of the
settlor. The income in the principal case was paid to the beneficiary and since
the legal estate was in the trustee it would seem that the settlor has nothing
left but a mere power of revocation which is not a property right., It is difficult
to understand how this is a sufficient interest to make the income taxable to the
settlor. The fact that he could have exercised his power of revocation, thus
making the income his own, cannot alter the fact that he did not so do. In reality
the settlor has not received the income which is taxed to him. Thus he is
being taxed upon the income of another,' and under the "due process" clause of
the Fifth Amendment, the constitutionality of the statute in question seems
doubtful The reasoning of the court that the statute is not retroactive and
applies to a trust created before its enactment seems clearly correct, for the
reason that the reservation of the power of revocation, which makes the income
taxable to the settlor, continues after the passage of the statute though the
creation of the trust was prior thereto,' and, therefore, after the passage of the
statute but before the income accrued, the settlor could have exercised his power
to revoke, making the income his own. The decision, also, is commendable in
that it carries out the purpose of the legislature which was to prevent the
'

"To the creation of a vald, express trust it is essential that some estate

or interest should be conveyed to the trustee .

.

.

. By such a trust, therefore,

something of the settlor's estate has passed from him and into the trustee, for
The trustee takes the whole estate necessary
the benefit of the cesid . ...
for the purposes of the trust." Nichols v. Emery, so9 Cal. 323, 330, 41 Pac.
io8g, IoOi (895).
'Old Colony Trust Co. v. Gardner, supra note 2.
'Re Dolan, 279 Pa. 582, 124 At. 176 (1924); Re Masbury, 28 App. Div.
580, 51 N. Y. Supp. 331 (1898) ; People v. Northern Trust Co., 289 Ill. 475, I24
N. E. 662 (1919) ; Note (1926) 75 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 168, 17o. Contra: Bullen
v. Wisconsin, 24o U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916).
'Jones v. Clifton, IoI U. S. 225 (1879) ; "The right of revocation, standing
alone, is not tantamount to a property right in the settlor; it possesses none of
the attributes of property." Re Dolan, supra note 6, at 590, 124 At. at 179.
7
Magill, Taxation of Unrealized Income (925) 39 HARv. L. Rlv. 82, 99.
'MONTGOMERY,
INCOME TAx PROCEDURE (1925) 1393. But see Magill,
Notes on, the Revenue Act of 1924-Income Tax Provisions (1924) 24 Cor. L.
Rlv. 836, 860, "The best analogy in support of this statute is probably found in the
decisions in the railroad lease cases, where the treasury vas upheld in taxing as
the lessor's income, amounts paid by the lessee directly to the shareholders of
the lessor in the form of dividends. There, as here, the control of the income
is in the person to whom it is taxed, whether he exercises it or not; there, as
here, the treasury is seeking to prevent tax evasion." Yet, curiously enough,
none of these cases was cited in the principal case.
SSaltonstall v. Saltonsiall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225 (926) ; Reinecke
v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1928) ; Chase National
Bank v. U. S., 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126 (1928).
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evasion of surtaxes by means of estates and trusts." But whether "due process"
is afforded by a statute which makes one person pay taxes upon the income of
another, remains in doubt.'
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-CoNsTRucrIoN OF ACCIDENT "ARISING
EMPLOYHTtNI-Plaintiff's intestate was employed by one of the defendants as a groom and caretaker, with an agreement,
OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF THE

as part of the consideration for his services, to transport him to church on
Sundays. While being so transported one Sunday in his employer's car, he was
killed in a collision with another car. Action was brought on a Death Act
Held, that a directed verdict for the defendant was not error, the accident
having arisen out of and in the course of intestate's employment, and being, therefore, compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. O'Mara v. Kirch
et a!., 147 Atl. 511 (N. J. 1929).
The New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act' provides that to be compensable an injury must result from "an accident arising out of and in the

course of [the worker's] employment". The construction of this phrase seems
to be universally settled as follows: "arising out of" indicates a general causal
relationship between the injury-producing accident and the employment; "in the
course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident; and,
finally, the two elements are conjunctive and both must be satisfied.' The application of the definition to the cases, however, has proved so difficult that the
courts' tend, as the New Jersey court sets out to do here, to fix the bounds
of the act by "concrete cases, as they arise"," and to construe the act "liberally
and broadly". To be sure, such a course has its advantages. Thus, the court may
ignore such ill-considered definitions as one in its leading case of Bryant V.
Fissell' under which, to reach the result of the instant case, it would have to

find that going to church on Sundays was the decedent's dity to his employer --a
10

But it is still possible to circumvent the provisions of the statute by

making a third person one of the beneficiaries, and exercising the power of

revocation in conjunction with such third person. Supra note 7, at 98.
Sn
Sprc note 8.

12 N. J. Comp. STAT. (igio) § 7 et seq.
IN. J. Comp. STAT. (CuM. Supp. 1925) § **236.
'Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, at 76, 86 At. 458, at 460 (913) ; McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, at 498 and 499, 102 N. E. 697 (1913) ; Fitzgerald
v. Clarke, L. R. 2 K. B. 796, at 799 (19o8); i HoNNoLD, WORKIMEN'S COM-

(1918) § IOI.
'The "arising out of and in the course of" provision, either in those or
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equivalent words, is to be found in a majority of the American acts. (The
acts passed before 1918 are collected in 2 HoNNoLD, op. cit. supra,note 3.)
'Thus Lord Loreburn, L. C., in the course of the argument on Kitchenham
v. S. S. "Johannesbury," 4 B. W. C. C. 311 (1911), says at 312: "We have to
decide each case on the facts. Argument by analogy is valueless."

'Su pra note 3.
'S pra note 3, at 78, 86 At. at 461, the court says:

".
. . an accident
arises 'out of' the employment when it is something the risk of which might have
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proposition to startle the most credulous; but, on the other hand, it is a very illadvised practice, in the final reckoning, to define what is probably the most
litigated phrase of the act by saying that fact-situation A falls within it and
fact-situation B outside it. Yet the court does cite a case' on all fours with
the instant case in which a decision that an accident "arose out of and in the
course of the employment" was supported on the basis that the employee's
right to use the conveyance there involved-specifically, his right to use his
employer's boat to get from the island on which he worked to his home on the
mainland-was implied in the contract of employment; thus the New Jersey
court suggests some reason for its decision. But from any standpoint-accepting the introductory definitions or substituting sound new ones-it is hard to see
how the collision in the instant case bore such a relation to the employment
that it may reasonably be said to have "arisen out of" it or "in the course
of" it. It is noteworthy, however, that the two cases have the common element
of a contractual right as part of the consideration and that it was in the course
of exercising such right that the accident occurred. May it not be stated as a
principle, then, that in some cases compensation will be awarded though the
injury arose out of and in the course of the performance of some other feature
of the contract than the employment itself? If so, we have a harmonizing principle for a host of cases which may be classified with the principal case as allowing compensation in spite of a lack of clear causal or circumstantial relationship
9
between the accident and the actual employment involved. Whether or not, in
'
practicaly substituting the words "contract of employment for "employment"
alone, these cases show a clearer appreciation of the socio-legal purpose of the
act" than the cases that give the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment ' some more or less definite restrictive effect is an interesting question.
been contemplated . . . when entering into the employment, as incidental to it
* * * A risk is incidental to the employment when jt belongs to or is connected
with what a workman has to do [our italics] in fulfilling his contract of service."
8
Richards v. Morris, L. R. i K. B. 221 (1915).
I For example, State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Acc. Com. 194 Cal. 28, 277
Pac. 168 (1924), where a hotel maid, whose contract of employment permitted
her to live at the hotel, was injured when leaving the hotel through the servant's
entrance on her "day off"; Von Ette's Case, 223 Mass. 56, 111N. E. 696, L. R. A.
1916 D, 641 (1916), where a compositor, in accordance with a custom, left his
work to go up to the roof of the building to cool off, and accidentally fell from
the roof; Etherton v. Johnstown Knitting Mills, 184 App. Div. 82o, 172 N. Y.
Supp. 724 (igi8), in which the employee had gone down to the basement to set
a bottle of tea on the boiler to be kept hot for her mid-day meal, and she was
injured on her way back; Cremins v. Guest, L. R. i K. B. 469 (igo8), where,
by an implied term of the contract, employer provided trains to convey employees
to and from work, and deceased was knocked down and killed by a train while
waiting on the station platform.
"SFor a treatment of the history, purpose and scope of the workmen's
compensation acts, see i HONNOLD, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 1-5.

